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Abstract
In several papers, John Norton has argued that Bayesianism cannot handle igno-
rance adequately due to its inability to distinguish between neutral and disconfirming
evidence. He argued that this inability sows confusion in, e.g., anthropic reasoning
in cosmology or the Doomsday argument, by allowing one to draw unwarranted con-
clusions from a lack of knowledge. Norton has suggested criteria for a candidate for
representation of neutral support. Imprecise credences (families of credal probability
functions) constitute a Bayesian-friendly framework that allows us to avoid inadequate
neutral priors and better handle ignorance. The imprecise model generally agrees with
Norton’s representation of ignorance but requires that his criterion of self-duality be
reformulated or abandoned.
Keywords: Imprecise credence; ignorance; indifference; principle of indifference; Dooms-
day argument; anthropic reasoning
1 Introduction: Bayesian Reasoning and Ignorance
If you ask me what the probability is of rolling a 2 with a throw of a fair, cubic die, I
will answer, “16 .” Now imagine that we are having a conversation about Shakespeare’s
play The Tempest and you ask me to assign a probability to the claim that the play has
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16,633 words. My response would be that I simply do not have a clue. My knowledge of
Elizabethan drama would allow me to say that the value falls within some interval, in which
all values seem equally plausible. However, I would not be able to assign a probability to
the claim that the play has exactly 16,633 words. If you insist on a probability, I would
respond—echoing David Albert—by asking, “What part of ‘I don’t have a clue’ do you not
understand?”
The simplest version of Bayesianism is ill-equipped to handle such a case. Reasoning
with the principle of indifference, as in the case of the die, motivates a uniform proba-
bility distribution over some interval of values; if there are 20,000 equiprobable numbers
in the plausible range of number of words for that play, each number will be assigned a
probability of 120,000 . Thus according to usual Bayesian confirmation theory, learning the
exact length of The Tempest is equivalent to confirming a claim with a very low probabil-
ity. In contrast, suppose that we are discussing whether or not the 1956 movie Forbidden
Planet is a good adaptation of The Tempest, and you ask me to assign a probability to
the claim that Shakespeare himself authored that movie’s screenplay. I would not be in-
different about that claim; I would assign to it a very low probability, and I would be very
surprised if it were confirmed. Yet orthodox Bayesianism does not allow one to distinguish
these two confirmations: it sees them both as the confirmation of a low-probability claim,
thereby justifying in both cases a same sense of surprise. One may legitimately be sur-
prised by the confirmation of a low-probability proposition, but not by the confirmation
of something about which we are entirely indifferent. In the absence of a representation of
neutral degree of belief, we have no choice but to treat large numbers of alternatives about
which we are equally indifferent as if they all were improbable propositions. Consequently,
any hypothesis—however unlikely—that lends more support to the observed value than
was initially given by the constant probability distribution will be seen as significantly
confirmed.
Steven Weinberg (1987) resorted to a similar kind of confirmation when he appealed
to anthropic constraints (i.e., constraints related to the possibility for life to exist) in
order to explain the value of the cosmological constant (i.e., the vacuum energy density
ρV ), left indeterminate by existing theories. Anthropic considerations provide bounds on
ρV , which can be neither too large (because then galaxies could not form) nor too small
(because then observers would not have time to arise before the universe recollapses).
However, the anthropically allowed range is quite large, and, in the absence of further
theories, it leaves us with many equipossible values for ρV . Weinberg further argued that
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anthropic considerations may have a stronger, predictive role. The idea is that we should
conditionalize the probability of different values of ρV on the number of observers they
allow: the most likely value of ρV is the one that allows for the largest number of galaxies
(taken as a proxy for the number of observers).1 The probability measure for ρV is then
as follows:
dp(ρV ) = ν(ρV ) · p?(ρV ) dρV ,
where p?(ρ) dρV is the prior probability distribution, and ν(ρV ) the average number of
galaxies which form for ρV . By assuming that there is no known reason why the likelihood
of ρV should be special at the observed value, and because the allowed range of ρV is very far
from what we would expect from available theories, Weinberg argued that it is reasonable to
assume that the prior probability distribution is constant within the anthropically allowed
range, so that dp(ρV ) can be calculated as proportional to ν(ρV ) dρV (Weinberg, 2000, 2).
Moreover, by assuming that we are typical observers (and thereby adopting what Alexander
Vilenkin (1995) called a ‘principle of mediocrity’), Weinberg predicted that the observed
value of this parameter should be close to the mean of the anthropically allowed values.
The initial uniform distribution is turned into a prediction, a sharply peaked distribution
around a preferred value. Later observations of the cosmological constant have been taken
to vindicate this reasoning (see, e.g., Weinberg, 2007).2
John Norton (2010) criticized the probabilistic representation of ignorance on which
such arguments rest. He objects to the claims that 1) there can be a probability distribution
over admissible values of some physical parameters when in fact those are left indeterminate
by existing theories, and more strenuously that 2) the observed value has low probability
instead of a neutral probability. Norton has suggested that the inability to distinguish
between neutral and disconfirming evidence is the sign a fundamental flaw of Bayesianism,
originating from the requirement of additivity. Therefore, for him, only a radically different
inductive logic can adequately represent ignorance.
Norton’s challenge is valid against the Bayesian who knows too much (i.e., who repre-
sents ignorance or indifference with a single uniform probability distribution). But there
are other Bayesians.
1This assumption is contentious (see, e.g., (Aguirre, 2001) for an alternative proposal).
2The median value of the distribution obtained by such anthropic prediction is about 20 times the
observed value ρobsV , whereas predictions based on existing theories are 120 orders of magnitude higher than
the observed value (Pogosian et al., 2004).
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2 A Bayesian Failure?
2.1 Neutral vs. Disconfirming
Before I discuss in more detail what a representation of neutral degree of belief—i.e., a
representation of indifference or ignorance—could look like, let me rephrase the problem
under consideration in Bayesian terms.
The Bayesian approach to epistemology can be characterized as follows (see, e.g., Joyce,
2010, 281-282):
- Belief is not all or nothing. One can assign degrees of belief to propositions.
- These degrees obey the laws of probabilities.3
- Learning implies updating an initial degree of belief (called prior) to obtain a poste-
rior. Updating a prior for hypothesis H after acquiring evidence E will involve taking
conditional probabilities and applying Bayes’s theorem:
p(H|E) = p(H) · p(E|H)
p(E)
,
where p(E|H) denotes the probability of E conditional on H (i.e., the probability of
E given H).
- Rational agents use their graded beliefs to choose actions with higher expected value.
A controversial but usual element of probability theory, the principle of indifference
claims that one must assign the same probability value to equipossible events, or events
about which we are equally ignorant or indifferent. If there are many such events, additivity
dictates that each of them be assigned a uniform, low probability value, which is equivalent
to saying that each event is improbable (or, equivalently, that their negation is probable).
We can now see how to rephrase the problematic arguments considered in §1:
1. The value of a parameter k is left indeterminate by our background knowledge.
According to the principle of indifference, that indeterminateness is represented by a
constant probability distribution widely spread over the admissible values of k, each
of which having low probability p(k|B).
3(1) For a probability function p, ∀α, p(α) ≥ 0; (2) if α is logically true, then p(α) = 1; (3) additivity:
if α, β are incompatible (p(α&β) = 0), then p(α ∨ β) = p(α) + p(β). It follows from these laws that
∀α, p(α) + p(¬α) = 1.
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2. A theory T makes the observed value kobs much more probable:
p(kobs|T&B) >> p(kobs|B).
3. According to Bayes’s theorem, we then have
p(T |kobs&B)
p(T |B) =
p(kobs|T&B)
p(kobs|B) >> 1.
In other words, observing kobs lends strong support to T .
For Norton, this confirmation is unwarranted. It is based on a flaw of Bayesianism
itself—namely, it has no ability to represent neutrality due to additivity (Norton, 2010,
501-502). Assigning a definite low probability value to a proposition about which we are
ignorant is then turning ignorance into improbability. It comes down to conflating discon-
firming evidence (p(H|E) << 1) with neutral evidential support (p(H|E) = p(¬H|E)).
2.2 A Non-Bayesian Notion of Neutral Support?
Norton (2007a, 2008, 2010) introduced the following criteria for a candidate for represen-
tation of neutral evidential support (or indifference, or ignorance):
- it cannot be additive (and therefore does not obey the laws of probability),
- it cannot be represented by the degrees of a one-dimensional continuum, such as the
reals in [0, 1],
- it must be invariant under redescription,4
- it must be invariant under negation: if we are ignorant or indifferent as to whether
or not α, we must be equally ignorant as to whether or not ¬α.
It is clear that usual Bayesianism cannot meet all these criteria. We should then look for
another framework for an inductive logic that would allow one not only to express ignorance
and indifference, but also to compare credences and carry out inferences and confirmation.
4The invariance under redescription only requires that the probability value that corresponds to neutral
support for a same event must not depend on how this event is described. For instance, in the example
given above in §1, book length was given in terms of number of words and could be redescribed in terms of
number of pages or lines.
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Norton confesses that he “know[s] of no adequate theoretical representation” of such a
framework (Norton, 2010, 504). He then simply refers to this representation of neutral
support as ‘I’, for ‘indifference’ or ‘ignorance’, with the following properties expressed in
terms of a (non-probabilistic) credal function p:
- ∀α, p(α) = I → p(¬α) = I (invariance under negation),
- ∀α1, α2 mutually exclusive (but α1 ∨ α2 6≡ >), p(α1) = p(α2) = I → p(α1 ∨ α2) = I
(non-additivity).5
This framework must also preserve the values p(>) = 1 = 1− p(⊥).6
This set of criteria for a representation of neutral evidential support is compelling.
Because of this conflict with additivity, representing neutrality is a serious challenge for
Bayesianism. But I will show that we need not abandon Bayesianism altogether, and that
enriched versions of it already in use can satisfy these criteria to a certain extent.
3 A Bayesian Notion of Neutral Support
3.1 Bayesian Credences Need Not Have Sharp Values
It has been argued (see, e.g., Levi, 1974; Walley, 1991; Joyce, 2010) that Bayesian credences
need not have sharp values, and that there can be imprecise probabilities.7 The difficulty
to assign sharp values to credences was already raised by Kyburg (1978), who saw this as
psychologically unrealistic. An imprecise probabilities model recognizes “that our beliefs
should not be any more definitive or unambiguous than the evidence we have for them.”
(Joyce, 2010, 320)
It is possible to reject a precise Bayesian model in favor of a less exact one, in which
credences are not well-defined but allow for imprecise values. Joyce defended an imprecise
model in which credences are not represented merely by a range of values, but rather by a
family of (probabilistic) credence functions. In this imprecise probability model,
5Strictly speaking, it is not entirely appropriate to define this condition in terms of additivity. For a
representation of credence to be ‘non-additive’ in the sense of interest to Norton here, it has to fulfill the
following condition: ∀α, β incompatible propositions about which we are completely indifferent or ignorant,
we can have neither p(α ∨ β) > p(α) nor p(α ∨ β) > p(β).
6> is an unconditionally true statement, and ⊥ an unconditionally false one.
7‘Imprecise credence’ is more appropriate than ‘imprecise probability’ since it does not necessarily obey
the laws of probability. Here I nevertheless use both expressions interchangeably, as is done in the literature.
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1. a believer’s overall credal state can be represented by a family C of cre-
dence functions [ci] (. . . ). Facts about the person’s opinions correspond
to properties common to all the credence functions in her credal state.
2. If the believer is rational, then every credence function in C is a probability.
3. If a person in credal state C learns that some event D obtains (. . . ), then
her post-learning state will be CD =
{
c(X|D) = c(X)c(D|X)
c(D)
: c ∈ C
}
.
4. A rational decision-maker with credal state C is obliged to prefer one
action α to another α∗ when α’s expected utility exceeds that of α∗ relative
to every credence function in C. (Joyce, 2010, 288)
In other words, in this imprecise probability model, a credal state can be represented
by a family of functions that behave as usual Bayesian, probabilistic credence functions.
Joyce also offers an analogy that illustrate this model: the overall credal state C acts as
a committee whose members (each being analogous to a credence function ci) are rational
agents who do not all agree with each other and who all update their credence in the same
way, by conditionalizing on evidence they all agree upon. With this analogy, the properties
of the overall credal state C correspond to those common to all the committee members.
There are several criteria for decision-making with imprecise probabilities between two
propositions. Depending on the criterion chosen, one will prefer an event to another event
if
- it has maximum lower expected value (Γ−minimax criterion),
- it has maximum higher expected value (Γ−maximax),
- it has maximum expected value for all distributions in the credal set (maximality),
- it has a higher expected value for at least one distribution in the credal set (E−admissibility),
or
- its lower expected value on all distributions in the credal set is greater than the other
event’s highest expected value on all distributions (interval dominance).8
8This list is not exhaustive. It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare and assess these criteria.
See (Troffaes, 2007; Augustin et al., 2014, §8) for reviews.
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This model allows one to simultaneously represent sharp and imprecise credences, but
also comparative probabilities. It can accommodate sharp credences, for which the usual
condition of additivity holds. But it can also accommodate less sharply defined relation-
ships when credences are fuzzy. It does so by means of a family of credence functions, each
of which is a Bayesian function that obeys the laws of probability.
3.2 Neutral Support with Imprecise Credences
This imprecise model allows one to distinguish two notions of neutral support: distin-
guish stochastic independence (true independence of evidence for a given hypothesis) and
unknown interaction (unknown dependence).
With a single (precise) probability distribution, two variables αm and αn in appropri-
ate algebras are stochastically independence if p(αm|αn) = p(αm) whenever p(αn) > 0.
Different concepts have been suggested to extend the notion of stochastic independence of
two variables αm and αn to the imprecise model (see Cozman, 2012), among which:
- complete independence, if stochastic independence of αm and αn obtains for each
distribution ci ∈ C,9
- confirmational irrelevance, if C(αm|αn) = C(αm),
- epistemic irrelevance, if stochastic independence obtains for the lowest expectation
among all functions ci ∈ C, or the related, symmetric concept of epistemic indepen-
dence (if αm is epistemically irrelevant to αn and αn to αm).
In contrast, unknown interaction between two variables αm and αn can be represented
by a credal set that contains credence functions that differ on the correlation between
αm and αn. Such a credal set would include credence functions ci that are such that
ci(αm&αn) ≤ ci(αm)·ci(αn) and others functions cj such that cj(αm&αn) > cj(αm)·cj(αn).
Following the committee analogy once again, in a state of unknown interaction between
αm and αn, jury members disagree with each other about that interaction. The overall
credal state of the committee neither favors nor dismisses any of the opinions of its jury
members; it can only express a lack of agreement.
The case of complete ignorance or indifference is of particular interest for the anthropic
argument presented in §1: we want to represent complete ignorance or indifference as to
9As discussed in (Cozman, 2012), this definition violates convexity.
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what value a certain physical parameter should have. With the imprecise model, recalling
the committee analogy, complete ignorance as to whether or not α (i.e., complete indif-
ference between which of α or ¬α is more likely) can be represented by a committee in
which there is no agreement among its members about whether or not α is more or less
probable than ¬α. This notion of neutral support is analog to Norton’s requirement that,
in order to express neutral support for an event α, a measure of belief about α be equal
to a corresponding measure of disbelief about α (Norton, 2007a). In the context of credal
sets, this requirement is fulfilled, for example, by a committee composed as follows:
for every jury member and for every contingent event α, there exists a jury
member who has as much disbelief in α as another has belief in it.
Or, to put it in terms of credence functions,
if C is a credal state representing a family of credence functions c about contin-
gent events α, if ∀c, α, ∃ c′ ∈ C such that c′(α) = 1− c(α), then C corresponds
to a state of ignorance.10
If all the jury members are rational (i.e., if all the credence functions are probability
functions), we must have, by definition, C(>) = 1 = 1− C(⊥).11
Such a credal state about a given event α can then be updated by conditionalizing
upon new evidence, taken as such by all the jury members (i.e., all the credence functions
c ∈ C). Thereby, after new evidence E is gathered, the range of values taken by all the
credence functions of C, c(α|E), is susceptible to change, and so is the overall credal state
regarding α.
A trivial but extreme example of representation of complete ignorance by means of a set
of credal functions is the set I of all possible probability distributions. For any proposition
α about which are completely ignorant, that representation of ignorance would give us
C(α) = [0, 1]. In case of complete ignorance, excluding possible probability distributions
compatible with our evidence is “pretending to have information [we do] not possess.”
(Joyce, 2005, 170) This proposal meets all of Norton’s criteria for a representation of
ignorance (see infra, § 2.2).
10It may be surprising to read that, for a certain proposition, a credal set that gives the set of values
{0.49, 0.51} is a better representation of ignorance than one that gives the set of values {0.1, 0.8}. It is here
a representation of ignorance that gives as much support to a proposition as it does to its negation that
this criterion captures.
11i.e., ∀c ∈ C, c(>) = 1 = 1− c(⊥).
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There is however a good reason not to be content with such an extreme represen-
tation of ignorance. Indeed, in that set I of all possible probability distributions will
be extremely sharp probability distributions that require an unreasonably large—or even
infinite—number of updatings before they can yield posteriors distributions that are sig-
nificantly different (Rinard, 2013). Such distributions in I are said to be dogmatic, and
consequently the whole set I is dogmatic. A representation of complete ignorance I, and
generally any vacuous prior, entails a vacuous posterior. This should prevent such a set
from being used in an inferential process in which we may hope to move away from a state
of ignorance after a certain number of iterations of Bayesian updating. This representation
of ignorance by means of a family of credal functions, although it satisfies Norton’s criteria
for ignorance, is incompatible with learning. That is why imprecise statisticians, who are
interested in inferential processes, prefer to deal with ‘near-ignorance’ (i.e., broad credal
intervals smaller than [0,1]) rather than complete ignorance, thereby ruling out dogmatic
priors (see Moral, 2012; Augustin et al., 2014; Walley, 1991, §7.3.7).
By way of example, let us represent our near-ignorance about three mutually exclusive
propositions α1, α2, α3 with a credal set C = {ci} consisting of probability functions defined
as follows:
α1 α2 α3
c1(αi) 0.9 0.05 0.05
c2(αi) 0.05 0.9 0.05
c3(αi) 0.05 0.05 0.9
and for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for all x 6= αi or their disjunctions, cj(x) = 0.
In this credal set, no value of αm is preferred to the others (i.e., no value of αm is
favored by all three distributions ci ∈ C); and for all αm, αn, m 6= n, C(αm) = C(αn). A
constant, unique probability distribution could express this as well. But this credal set tells
us more than that, namely that, for all m, no proposition αm is preferred to its negation
(i.e., no value of αm is favored over its negation by all three distributions ci ∈ C).
This example does not satisfy the characterization of ignorance proposed earlier. How-
ever, we can see that, with a few amendments, this set suffices to represent indifference
about any of these propositions αi, and can meet the requirements for a representation of
neutral support (see above §2.2):
- it is not a sharp value in [0, 1],
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- it can be defined so as to be invariant under redescription: ∀α, a (a, redescription of
α), if C(α) represents a state of ignorance, so will C(a),12
- it is invariant under negation (no proposition α is preferred to its negation).
- we do have C(α1 ∨ α2 ∨ α3) = C(>) = 1 = 1− C(⊥).
The criterion of non-additivity (see infra, note 5) cannot be satisfied in a trivial manner.
In the example above, we have ∀i,m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3},m 6= n, ci(αm ∨ αn) > ci(αm). That
is also true of the bounds of the credal intervals (they will not be non-additive). But we
can prevent that by adding to our set credal functions ck such that ck(α1 ∨ α2) = ck(α1)
and so on. That is, we can add to our initial set three other functions c4, c5, and c6 so
as to have ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3},∃ cj ∈ C, j ∈ {4, 5, 6} such that cj(αi) = 0. But the newly added
functions are not reasonable, since if we agreed that the propositions αi are contingent,
then no function ruling them out completely should be accepted in our credal set.
However, adopting certain conventions can mitigate the effects of additivity. If among
the criteria for decision-making with credal sets introduced earlier in § 3.1 we choose that
of interval dominance, then our representation of credence is non-additive in this example
(i.e., for all m,n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, αm ∨ αn is not preferred to αm). However, one might argue
that interval dominance is often not a desirable criterion. It is a demanding criterion that
allows one to express a preference between two propositions only if one is unambiguously
better than the other. This criterion is arguably not fined-grained enough to help us for
most of the inferences we are likely to encounter. Other, often more desirable decision-
making criteria, however, will result in additive imprecise credences. With other decision
rules, we could under circumstances circumvent additivity by adopting threshold values,
beyond (respectively below) which all values are considered to be equally confirmatory
(respectively disconfirmatory). For instance, in the set given above, if we consider that any
value below 0.1 is equally disconfirmatory and any value beyond 0.9 is equally confirmatory,
then we lose all additivity.
We could also adopt a different strategy that does not involve such conventions. For any
proposition α about which we are ignorant (whether the αi or their Boolean combinations),
we can define a credal set C such that C(α) = C(¬α). The imprecise model allows us to
treat equipossible propositions in the same way, which does not mean that they must
12If the functions in this set are described as Dirichlet distributions, then this criterion will be satisfied
(see, e.g., de Cooman et al., 2009).
Y. Bene´treau-Dupin The Bayesian Who Knew Too Much 12 of 21
receive a same probability value or be represented by the same credal set. By ‘sameness of
treatment’ of contingent, equipossible events about which we are ignorant or indifferent, I
mean that our credal state of ignorance about them would be modeled in the same manner,
by a credal set having the same desired properties. We will come back to this in the next
section.
With the imprecise model, not one single set of functions or one set of rules to define
it will be suited to truly represent ignorance in all situations, unless we are ready to
represent a state of complete ignorance by the undesirable and unreasonable set I of all
possible credal functions. But this model allows one to define sets that do not favor any of
the propositions about which we are ignorant and that is suited to a particular ensemble
of propositions under consideration. It does so by means of Bayesian credence functions,
which allows for our credal state to be updated and evolve. All that this requires is that
we do not demand that agent’s credences have sharp values.
3.3 Norton’s Objections
3.3.1 Interpretative objections
Norton (2007a,b, 2008) has formulated several objections to the imprecise model. He has
expressed a general discomfort with what he considers to be an inadequate approach, “an
attempt to simulate an inherently nonadditive logic with an additive measure, rather than
to seek the logic directly.” (Norton, 2010, 504, note 4). But as indirect or contrived as this
method might seem, it is successfully applied in statistical analysis (see, e.g., Walley, 1991;
Augustin et al., 2014). Yet Norton has raised more pointed criticisms of the imprecise
model, about the very question of representing ignorance:
the representation [of ignorance by sets of probability functions] is not literally
correct. That is, ignorance is not the maintaining of all possible beliefs at once;
it is the maintaining of none of them. So we should regard the device of convex
sets as a way of simulating ignorance through a convenient fiction.13 (Norton,
2007b, §4.2)
Or elsewhere:
13This remark also applies to non-convex sets.
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The sort of ignorance I seek to characterize is first order ignorance; it is just
not knowing which is the true outcome; not a second order uncertainty about
an uncertainty. (Norton, 2007a, §6.2)
Such criticism is in fact not specific to the question of representing ignorance. It is
aimed more generally at the use of several credal functions in order to represent a unique
credal state.14 But it does not apply to the imprecise model we have considered here,
and, in general, proponents of imprecise probabilities need not endorse this view. Indeed,
this model does not allow “the maintaining of all possible beliefs at once.” Even though a
credal set may be comprised of several credal functions, the agent’s credence it represents
is unique; its properties are those that are common to all the credal functions in that set. If
all possible beliefs could be held at once—or rather, if no particular belief can be preferred
to any other—an agent’s credence would not be multiple, it would just not be any of these
particular beliefs.
3.3.2 Indifference and self-duality
Another criticism more specifically aimed at the issue of representing ignorance or indif-
ference deserves a closer examination. Norton (2007a) argues that a representation of
ignorance should satisfy what he calls a condition of self-duality. The dual of a measure
of belief is a measure of disbelief. If we are ignorant about a proposition α, our degree
of belief that α should not be different from our degree of disbelief that α: “the state [of
complete ignorance] is self-dual in its contingent propositions (. . . ).” (Norton, 2007a, §6.1,
247) This follows from the requirement of invariance under negation for a representation
of neutral support.
We saw earlier in § 3.2 that no single probability function (or in general no measure,
additive by definition) can meet this criterion.15 Any probability function will necessarily
express a (non-strictly) increasing belief as we go from propositions to their logical con-
sequences (e.g., for any functions c in a credal set, α1 ` α1 ∨ α2 → c(α1 ∨ α2) ≥ c(α1)).
On the other hand, a measure of disbelief should be (non-strictly) decreasing as we go
14The following passage makes it clear that Norton thinks of the use of a set of probability functions as
allowing the simultaneous representation of several states of belief: “the use of sets renders ignorance as a
second order sort of belief. We allow that many different belief-disbelief states are possible. We represent
ignorance by presenting them all, in effect saying that we dont know which is the pertinent one.” (Norton,
2007a, §6.2, 248)
15Unless we are dealing with only two mutually exclusive propositions.
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from propositions to their logical consequences. Consequently, no probability function can
simultaneously express our belief and our disbelief in a certain proposition, even if we con-
sider only contingent propositions. This, however, is not necessarily true of credal sets. We
also saw in § 3.2 that if decision-making is based on interval dominance, then imprecise
credences need not be additive for contingent propositions. Consequently, an imprecise
credence represented by a set of functions as the one given in § 3.2 can simultaneously
represent belief and disbelief (at least for contingent propositions).
On Norton’s account (Norton, 2007a, § 3.2,6.2), a credal set C representing ignorance
is self-dual if it contains probability functions ci and their duals c
′
i such that ∀ci ∈ C, c′i is
such that ∀α, ci(α) = c′i(¬α) and ci(¬α) = c′i(α). It is clear that we cannot have such a
set. Indeed, if we have
∀c ∈ C,∃ c′ ∈ C such that ∀α, c′(α) = 1− c(α),
then if α ≡ > and c is a probability function, we would get
c′(α ≡ >) = 1− c(>) = 0,
and then c′ would break the second law of probability (see infra note 3). Norton restricts
the requirement of self-duality to contingent events only, which are the only relevant ones
when we want to define a representation of ignorance or indifference. But even if we forget
about logical truths and contradictions, additivity will forbid such a self-dual set. Indeed,
for two propositions α and β mutually exclusive, we do not get ∀i, c′i(α∨β) = 1−ci(α∨β) =
c′i(¬(α ∨ β)). If it were the case, we would obtain
c′i(α ∨ β) = ci(¬(α ∨ β))
= c′i(α) + c
′
i(β)
= ci(¬α) + ci(¬β)
For i such that ci(α) << 1, ci(¬α) ' 1 and we may have c′i(α∨β) = ci(¬α)+ci(¬β) > 1,
which would prevent c′i from being a probability function. If this set is not self-dual for
α and β mutually exclusive, it cannot be self-dual for all α and the credal state as I have
defined it cannot be self-dual.
In contrast, as we saw above in § 3.2, for any set of contingent propositions, the imprecise
model allows us to define sets that represent our indifference or ignorance. The proposal
for a representation of neutral support we saw above in § 3.2, according to which if C is
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a credal state representing a family of credence functions c about contingent events α, C
corresponds to a state of indifference if ∀c, α, ∃ c′ ∈ C such that c′(α) = 1−c(α), differs from
Norton’s criterion of self-duality (note the different placement of the universal quantifier
on α). The imprecise model as I have considered it here does not guarantee us than once
a credal set is defined so as to represent indifference about a set of propositions, it will
necessarily adequately represent our indifference about all their Boolean combinations, nor,
in general, that it will adequately provide neutral support to any other proposition we are
indifferent about. This model does not suggest either that the same rules used to define
a credal set representing indifference should apply to all situations (this will be illustrated
below in § 4).
If we consider only contingent propositions, and if decision-making is based on interval
dominance, then with imprecise probabilities we have at our disposal a representation of
ignorance or indifference that shares with a self-dual representation the relevant properties
for a representation of neutral support, namely the ability to simultaneously represent
belief and disbelief. With other decision rules (e.g., Γ-minimax), a self-dual representation
of ignorance or indifference could only express nothing less than complete ignorance. We
saw in § 3.2 that such a credal set, I, exists, but we also saw that it is incompatible
with learning. The less demanding representations of ignorance or indifference I have
considered here have over a self-dual representation a clear expressive advantage. We
saw that the imprecise model allows one to distinguish between stochastic independence,
epistemic irrelevance, unknown interaction, or ignorance or indifference about the value of
a parameter. It can fulfill criteria of a representation of ignorance better than what a single
probability function can do, yet it does so by means of probability functions, each of which
can subsequently be modified following Bayes’s rule. Consider for instance the 3-function
example from § 3.2. Now assume that the probability of αi in that example corresponds to
the probability of drawing the numbered ball Bi from an urn (with replacement between
each draw). Assume further that we are interested in determining a bias—of our urn or
the balls—in this drawing. How should we represent our initial state of ignorance in a
way that does not prevent us from eventually finding a value after a sufficient iteration of
Bayesian updating? It is unclear how Norton’s non-probabilistic, self-dual representation
of complete ignorance, ‘I’, can evolve, whereas it is possible for our 3-function credal set
to yield such a result eventually.16 Notwithstanding the lack of self-duality, the ability for
16See (Piatti et al., 2009; Moral, 2012) for a discussion about the conditions on a near-ignorance credal
set required for learning. These requirements favor the use of Dirichlet distributions.
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credal sets representing indifference or ignorance to be updated is a desirable feature that
makes an imprecise representation of indifference a more interesting element of inductive
logic than Norton’s self-dual measure I.
The kind of representation of ignorance that Norton seeks is part of a larger inductive
logic yet to be carried out. It is in the light of the search for a unique representation
of our credences that Norton imposes this criterion of self-duality of complete ignorance,
applicable to any proposition about which we are ignorant. In this context, it is a plausible
requirement. But it is a very strong condition that can leave one wondering how a unique
representation as the one Norton proposes—which would yield the same value ‘I’ whatever
the event about which we are ignorant—can be used in a fruitful inductive process. Norton
offers no compelling reason why his demanding notion of self-duality should be required
of alternative representations of ignorance or indifference such as the ones the imprecise
model affords us.
4 Dissolving Cosmic Confusions
In order to emphasize how ill-equipped Bayesianism (or any other inductive framework
based on additive measures) is in order to deal with ignorance, and to show its inability
to avoid unwarranted conclusions, Norton (2010) invited us to consider two instances of
‘cosmic confusion.’ These are anthropic reasoning (see infra, § 1) and the Doomsday
argument. In both cases, we draw conclusions from a lack of knowledge. We can see how
the use of imprecise credences can dissolve what Norton referred to as ‘cosmic confusions’
in a way no unique probability distribution can.17
The Doomsday argument is a family of arguments about humanity’s likely survival (see,
e.g., (Bostrom, 2002, §6-7), (Richmond, 2006) for reviews). It allows one to compare the
likelihood of two scenarios about humanity’s survival or even make a prediction about the
end date for humanity based only on the assumption that our place on humanity’s timeline
is random. Some versions of this argument have been addressed within the framework of
orthodox Bayesianism so as to block any conclusion we could draw from these assumptions
alone. But a variant of this argument, based on the assumption that we have a random birth
rank among all humans (Gott, 1994), cannot be dissolved without appealing to imprecise
credences. The argument goes as follows. Let r be my birth rank (i.e., I am the rth human
17I have given a more detailed presentation of the problems and solutions discussed in this section in
(Bene´treau-Dupin, forth.).
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to be born), and N the total number of humans that will ever be born.
1. Assume that there is nothing special about my rank r. Following the principle of
indifference, whatever r, the probability of r conditional on N is p(r|N) = 1
N
.
2. Assume the following improper prior18 for N : p(N) =
k
N
. k is a normalizing constant
whose value does not matter.
3. This choice of distributions p(r|N) and p(N) gives us the prior distribution p(r):
p(r) =
∫ N=∞
N=r
p(r|N)p(N) dN =
∫ N=∞
N=r
k
N2
dN =
k
r
.
4. Then, Bayes’s theorem gives us
p(N |r) = p(r|N) · p(N)
p(r)
=
r
N2
,
which favors small N and allows us to make an estimate for N at any confidence-level.
This result should strike us as surprising: we should not be able to learn something from
nothing! Indeed, according to that argument, we can make a prediction for N based only
on knowing our rank r and on not knowing anything about the probability of r conditional
on N , i.e., on being indifferent—or equally uncommitted—about any value it may take.
In this argument, any choice of prior probability distribution will result in a prediction
for N , at any confidence-level. However, if our prior ignorance or indifference about N ,
C(N), is represented by a credal set containing an infinity of credal functions, {c : c ∈ C},
each normalizable, defined on N>0, and such that ∀c ∈ C, limN→∞(c(N)) = 0 (e.g., a
family of Pareto distributions), then the resulting prediction for N diverges. In other
words, this imprecise representation of prior credence in N , reflecting our ignorance about
N , does not yield any prediction about N . Without the possibility for my prior credence
to be represented not by a single probability distribution, but instead by an infinite set of
probability distributions, I cannot avoid obtaining an arbitrarily precise prediction.
18As Gott (1994) recalls, this choice of prior is fairly standard (albeit contentious) in statistical analysis.
It is the Jeffreys prior for the unbounded parameter N , such that p(N) dN ∝ d lnN ∝ dN
N
. This means
that the probability for N to be in any logarithmic interval is the same. This prior is called improper
because it is not normalizable, and it is usually argued that it is justified when it yields a normalizable
posterior.
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In the case of the cosmological constant problem (see infra § 1), representing our prior
ignorance or indifference about the value of the vacuum energy density ρV by an imprecise
credal set can limit, if not entirely dissolve, the appeal of anthropic considerations. As we
saw earlier, Weinberg (1987) argued that, in the absence of useful theoretical background,
it was reasonable to assume a constant, uniform prior probability distribution for ρV within
the anthropically allowed range, and then conditionalize on the number of observers each
value of ρV would allow for. With the imprecise model, a state of indifference between
different values of ρV within the anthropically allowed range can be expressed by a set of
probability distributions {c? : c? ∈ C?}, all of which normalizable over the anthropic range
and such that ∀ρV , ∃ c?i, c?j ∈ C? such that ρV is favored by c?i and not by c?j .19 It is
in principle possible to define this prior credal set so that for any value of ρV , the lowest
expectation value among the the posteriors is lower than the highest expectation value
among the priors. If then we adopt interval dominance as a criterion for decision-making,
then no observation of ρV will be able to lend support to our anthropic prediction.
As we saw earlier, one may object to the adoption of interval dominance in such a case.
This choice of demanding decision rule could be motivated by the fact that we have no
plausible alternative theoretical framework to the anthropic argument. In this context, it
can be reasonable to agree to increase one’s credence about the anthropic explanation only
if it does better than any other yet unknown alternative might have done. Nonetheless,
if we adopt other decision rules, it is possible with the imprecise model to construct prior
credal sets that define a large interval over the anthropic range such that the confirmatory
boost obtained after observing ρV is not nearly as vindicative as it is with a single, uniform
distribution.
5 Conclusion
Norton (2010) has correctly argued that representing neutrality with a broadly spread
single probability distribution amounts to conflating ignorance with improbability. He has
shown how this leads to unwarranted confirmations. I here claim that a credal state of
ignorance should best be represented by an imprecise credence. With this approach, merely
acquiring information about the value of a certain parameter cannot suffice to justify a sense
of surprise. The imprecise model offers us a more adequate representation of neutrality
19For reasons expressed earlier in footnotes 12 and 16, this should preferably be done by means of Dirichlet
distributions.
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and prevents prior credences from doing too much inductive work, as is illustrated by its
ability to block the consequence of the Doomsday argument better than what orthodox
Bayesianism can do.
We saw that, if we adopt interval dominance as a criterion for decision-making, it is
possible for an imprecise representation of indifference to meet the criteria for a represen-
tation of neutral support put forth in (Norton, 2007a, 2008, 2010). But if we adopt less
demanding decision-making rules, we can still construct a representation of indifference by
means of credal sets that meet these criteria to a large extent, and we can do so without
compromising Bayesianism altogether. It only requires that we do not demand that cre-
dences be sharp nor that a unique representation be applicable to all cases of ignorance or
indifference (i.e., that self-duality be abandoned).
One can see Norton’s argument as emphasizing the perils of excessive structure im-
ported from probability theory into inductive logic, and then arguing that we need to
eliminate much of that structure. There are several ways to modify the mathematical
structure to counter the assumption of additivity. Norton’s stated motivations are not
sufficient to force us to adopt the framework he advocates. The imprecise model has the
advantage of allowing us to distinguish different kinds of ignorance and indifference. More
importantly, it makes it possible to move out of a state of ignorance when we acquire
interesting information.
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